[28]
Therefore, as I said before, the dignity of a consul has never been consistent with that
science; being one consisting wholly of fictitious and imaginary formulas. And its right to
public gratitude was even much smaller. For that which is open to every one, and which is
equally accessible to me and to my adversary, cannot be considered as entitled to any
gratitude. And therefore you have now, not only lost the hope of conferring a favour, but even
the compliment that used to be paid to you by men asking your permission to consult you. No
one can be considered wise on account of his proficiency in that knowledge which is neither of
any use at all out of Rome, nor at Rome either during the vacations. Nor has any one any right
to be considered skillful in law, because there cannot be any difference between men in a
branch of knowledge with which they are all acquainted. And a matter is not thought the more
difficult for being contained in a very small number of very intelligible documents.
Therefore, if you excite my anger, though I am excessively busy, in three days I will profess
myself a lawyer. In truth, all that need be said about the written law is contained in written
books; nor is there anything written with such precise accuracy, that I cannot add to the
formula, “which is the matter at present in dispute.” If you answer what
you ought, you will seem to have made the same answer as Servius; if you make any other reply,
you will seem to be acquainted with and to know how to handle disputed points.
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